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TRADE OPENNESS AND CITY INTERACTION 
Mauricio Ramírez Grajeda
a





The New Economic Geography framework supports the idea that economic integration 
plays an important role in explaining urban concentration. By using Fujita et al. (1999) as 
a theoretical motivation, and information on the 5 most important cities of 84 countries, 
we find that the size of main cities declines and the size of secondary cities increases as a 
result of external trade. Similar results are obtained for cities with a population over a 
million. However, cities with a large fraction of the urban population grow independently 
of their position in the urban ranking. The implications for urban planners and 
development economists is that investment in infrastructure must take place in secondary 
cities when a country is involved in a process of trade liberalization, especially, those 
located near ports. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Keywords: New Economic Geography, Trade Openness, Agglomeration and Urban 
Economics. 
JEL Classification: F12, F15 and R12. 
“Trade is spatial by nature.” 
Rossi-Hansenberg (2006, p. 1464) 
Introduction 
During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the “import substitution” paradigm dominated 
within policy circles in countries of the developing world such as Brazil, India or Mexico, 
among others, see Edwards (1993) and Krueger (1997). In addition, metropolises also 
emerged in those countries: Sao Paulo, Bombay and Mexico City. This paper deals with 
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In this context, standard trade theory does not explain both intra-industry trade and 
its spatial implications, but instead focuses on the reasons for trade, the impact on prices 
due to changes in fundamental variables, the welfare implications of trade and the 
allocation effects of trade restrictions. Moreover, the system of cities literature mainly 
consists of intrametropolitan analysis of spatial structure, but lacks an explicit model with 
intermetropolitan implications (Ionnides, 2004).  
The theoretical basis of this paper, (Krugman & Livas, 1996) and (Fujita, Krugman 
and Venables, 1999), does frame old ideas on space, intra-industry trade and city 
interaction by embedding trade costs, increasing returns to scale and love for variety in a 
general equilibrium setting.
2
 The former claims that restrictive “trade policies of the 
developing countries and their tendency to develop huge metropolitan cities are closely 
linked”. On the other hand, trade openness undermines advantages of urban concentration 
which arise from proximity to industrial suppliers and consumers. The market structure 
associated with (Krugman & Livas, 1996), and Fujita et al. (1999) is monopolistic 
competition à la (Dixit & Stiglitz, 1977). Given three local cities and high international 
trade costs, the larger a city is, in terms of population, the higher its real wage is with 
respect to the secondary ones (centripetal force). Therefore, consumers/workers migrate 
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1 This paper focuses on the distribution of economic activity across space under the NEG framework. However, 
according to (Fujita & Thisse, 1996), there are two other major approaches that also address this issue. One takes 
informational spillovers under perfect competition as a centripetal force, see Henderson (1974) and Rauch (1991). The 
other considers spatial competition under strategic interaction, Hotelling (1929). 
2
 NEG reintroduces old ideas on space from Von Thünen (1826), Weber (1909), Christaller (1933) and Lösch (1940). 
3 
 
from the secondary cities to the main one. Although more concentration negatively 
affects real wages due to congestion (centrifugal force), workers keep flowing to the main 
city up to the point where real wages are equalized across cities because both opposite 
forces cancel each other out. This self-reinforcing dynamic is interrupted when 
international trade costs fall below a threshold, where agglomeration does not sustain 
differentials in real wages for further population growth. In summary, concentration of 
production activities arises from the interplay of centripetal and centrifugal 
agglomeration forces. These models work for any level of urban population and suggest 
that city interaction arises as a consequence of trade openness because it enhances 
competition among secondary cities to attract workers that have moved out from the main 
city. 
Stylized facts show that both trade openness and urbanization have steadily grown 
since 1970. By assuming spatial dependence, the aim of this paper is to disentangle the 
effects of trade openness on the size of the most important cities for 84 countries after 
controlling for political, geographic and economic factors in the 1970-2000 period. The 
key results are that main cities reduce in size and secondary cities (ranked from 2 to 5) 
grow when trade openness is increased. Similar results arise for cities with a population 
over a million. In both cases our results are consistent over time and for different trade 
openness definitions related to trade volumes. With respect to cities whose population 
represents 5 percent or more of the urban population little can be said though. 
Furthermore, the fundamental relationship between internal trade costs and the size of 
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cities established by Krugman (1991) is empirically supported: the higher the trade costs 
are the lower is the urban agglomeration.
3
 
In this vein, other economists have given a prominent role to the effects of 
international trade on the world’s main cities size. Venables (1998) investigates the 
effects of external trade costs on the share of manufacturing employment. A single city 
will have a high amount of employment when the economy of a country is closed to 
external trade. However, when the economy has access to imports due to lower trade 
costs the amount of industrial employment goes down. The economy develops a 
duocentric structure if it is open to external trade. Alonso-Villar (2001), following the 
(Krugman & Livas 1996) setting, adds a new foreign country and suggests that the 
negative relationship between trade openness and city size depends on the relative size of 
the home country. If it is small with regard to the rest of the world, a dispersed 
equilibrium is not sustainable given low levels of trade costs. By the same token, Mansori 
(2003) introduces a fixed and a marginal trade cost that may cause the following two 
outcomes after trade barriers fall. One is that a megalopolis that is already in equilibrium 
does not shrink in size: Buenos Aires and Bangkok are examples of this outcome; and the 
other is that cities in the dispersed equilibrium become a megalopolis like Seoul.
4
 
In the NEG literature, there are different explanations for urban concentration. For 
example, Puga (1998) explains the urbanization differences between Europe and 
developing countries. He finds that European countries developed a balanced urban 
                                                          
3 There is an inconsistency in (Ades & Glaeser, 1995). On pages 211-212, they claim that their results support 
Krugman (1991): high internal trade costs create incentives for the concentration of economic activities. But they 
should have written dispersion instead of concentration. 
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system in the 19
th
 century due to high trade costs, weak economies of scale and a 
relatively low supply of labor from rural areas. On the contrary, in developing countries 
trade costs were low, economies of scale at firm level strong and there was an abundant 
pool of peasants available to migrate into their cities. 
On the empirical side, (Rosen & Resnick, 1980) show that countries that export a 
small fraction of their gross national product tend to have a larger degree of urban 
primacy. (Ades & Glaeser, 1995) examine the forces that concentrate population in a 
single city. They define three types of agglomeration force: political, economic and 
geographic. They use a sample of 85 countries and information on their prime cities. 
Their basic results related to political forces are that main cities are 42 percent larger if 
they are also capitals; they are 45 percent larger in countries with dictatorial regimes. 
Furthermore, political factors affect urban concentration but not the other way around. 
The results related to economic forces are the following: first, a one standard-deviation 
increase in the share of trade in GDP reduces the size of the main city by 13 percent; 
second, a 1 percent increase in the ratio of import duties increase the size by 3 percent; 
and finally, a 1 percent increase in the share of government transportation expenditure in 
GDP reduces the size by 10 percent. Regarding geographic forces a 10 percent increase 
in the area of the country increases population in the main city by about 1.2 percent. 
Hanson (1998) summarizes the literature on changes in spatial organization among 
North American countries since NAFTA took place. More precisely, he focuses on the 
case of Mexico City to demonstrate that its population decreased due to a process of trade 
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liberalization that started in the mid-1980s.
5
 After forty years of industrialization based 
on the “import substitution” paradigm, Mexico opened its economy to international trade 
by becoming a member of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Hanson 
(1996, 1997) finds that trade liberalization has contributed toward the break up of the 
traditional manufacturing belt around Mexico City and the formation of export oriented 
centers along the U.S.-Mexican border. 
(Gaviria & Stein, 2000) find that the impact of international trade depends on 
geography. Population growth does not change in cities located at ports whereas 
landlocked cities exhibit slower growth. Nitsch (2003) tests the effects of trade volumes 
on the main cities for 111 countries.
 6
 His most important result is that both main and 
secondary cities (from 2 to 5) reduce their size with higher trade flows. 
It is worth mentioning that the relationship between external trade and city size can 
have a different explanation outside the NEG theory. For example, (Ades & Glaser, 
1995), explain that the current size of Buenos Aires is the result of two factors that arise 
in the late nineteenth century. One is international migration mainly from Italy and Spain. 
And two, the concentration of rent seeking activities around international trade activities 
at this port. Another case is the primacy of Mexico City due to the high level of 
incentives created by the political system to migrate from rural areas.
7
 
The reminder of the paper is divided up as follows. Section 1 contains the 
theoretical framework and a discussion of the equilibrium conditions. Section 2 suggests 
                                                          
5 He never mentions that the very same day that Mexico got its full membership in GATT (9/19/1985), an earthquake 
killed 30,000 people in Mexico City.  
6 This paper is partially inspired by Nitsch (2003) because he also covers secondary cities. 
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the hypotheses on trade openness and city size. Section 3 is focused on the model 
specification and the estimation strategy. Definitions of trade openness are provided in 
section 4. In section 5, the construction of the data set is explained, while. In section 6, 
the basic results are shown. Finally, some implications of the results are presented. 
 
1. Theory 
To motivate the hypotheses to be tested, this section outlines the model of Fujita et 
al. (1999) for J locations.
8
 It embeds imperfect competition in a dynamic general 
equilibrium setting, and assumes an exogenous congestion cost that directly affects real 
wages. Specific assumptions are set in order to analyze the way cities interact within an 
international context for different levels of trade openness. 
The economy consists of one sector, which is monopolistically competitive. There 
are j = 1, …, J locations, each one is endowed with Lj agents (consumers/workers). λj 
denotes the fraction of the population that lives in location j. It is assumed that 







j LL  
Trade costs are of the Samuelson (1952) type: Tjj´≥0 denotes the amount of any 
variety dispatched per unit received.
 9
 It is assumed that if j=j’ then Tjj’=1; and Tjj’= Tj’j. 
It is worth mentioning four implications of assuming this type of trade costs. First, it 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7
 Related references are (Ricahardson & Bae, 2005) and (Kresl & Fry, 2005), who overview the relationship between 
ubanization and globalization. The latter analyses the cases of Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Tijuana and Bogota. 
8 This model heavily draws on (Krugman & Livas, 1996). 
9 For (Limao & Venables, 2001) the cost of doing business across countries depends on geography, infrastructure, 
administrative barriers (e.g. tariffs) and the structure of the shipping industry (e.g. carriage, freight and insurance).  
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avoids the introduction of a transportation industry which might complicate the model 
when solving for the equilibrium. Second, it is a necessary condition for preserving a 
constant elasticity of aggregate demand. This feature simplifies the profit maximization 
conditions.
10
 Third, Tjj´ may represent an explicit ad valorem tariff whose revenues are 
redistributed among economic agents but dissipated as a consequence of rent-seeking.
11
 
And fourth, trade costs are not related to the variety or distance between locations. 
The representative agent in location j derives her utility from consumption 
represented by 




















njj cU  
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of varieties and cnj is the 
consumption of each available variety, n, in location j. Under these preferences, desire for 
variety is measured by (σ-1)/σ. If it is close to 1, for example, varieties are nearly perfect 
substitutes. 
At the level of the firm, technology exhibits increasing return to scale.
12
 The 
quantity of labor required to produce q units of variety n in region j is 
(3)                                                         ,jnjn qFl   
where F and v are fixed and marginal costs, respectively. The firm that produces variety n 
in region j pays nominal wage, wjn, for one unit of labor. In order to characterize the 
                                                          
10 A constant elasticity of aggregate demand means that firms maximize profits by setting a price that is a constant 
mark-up over marginal cost. A specific level of production satisfies this condition.  
11 Agents devote resources (lobbying expenses, lawyer’s fees and public relations costs) to obtain these tariff revenues.  
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equilibrium, F = 1/σ and  = (σ-1)/σ.13 The number of firms in location j, nj, is 
endogenous. N = n1+…+nJ  is the total number of available varieties. 
There are two types of prices: mill (or f.o.b) and delivered (c.i.f.).
14
 The former are 
charged by firms. The latter, paid by consumers, are defined as  




jj Tpp   
where p
n
j denotes the mill price of a good of variety n produced in location j. p
n
jj´ is the 
delivered price in location j´. By the assumptions on trade costs, both prices are equal 
when j=j´. 
Real wages in location j are defined as  
(5)                                                         ,1 jjj Gw  
where Gj is a price index, which is the minimum cost of achieving one unit of utility 
given N varieties and N prices associated with them.
15
 
Short- run equilibrium 
The economy reaches its short-run equilibrium when agents and firms optimize 
their utility and profit functions respectively, such that the market clearing conditions in 
both labor and product markets are satisfied.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 Increasing returns to scale are essential in explaining the distribution of economic activities across space. This is 
known as the “Folk Theorem of Spatial Economics”. 
13 To assume a particular value of F means to choose units of production such that solving for the equilibrium is easier. 
To assume a particular value of  allows us to characterize the equilibrium without loss of generality. 
14 f.o.b stands for free on board and c.i.f. for carriage, insurance and freight. 
15 G is defined in equation 2.6. 
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Assumptions on agent’s taste, trade costs, technology parameters, free entry and 
exit of firms and a potentially unlimited value of N, allow the characterization of the 
equilibrium as follows. Nominal wages are equal within a particular location. Profits are 
zero. Since there are no economies of scope each firm produces a single variety. All firms 
hire the same amount of labor irrespective of the variety they produce and their location, 
then the level of production across varieties is equal. Within a particular location, mill 
prices are equal across varieties, then they can be denoted without the n as in (4). Agents 
consume all varieties. Within a particular location, consumption across agents is 
identical, where the consumption level in location j is equal across all varieties produced 
in j´, nj´. By knowing this characterization and given 1, …,j, then the short- run 
equilibrium can be redefined as a vector: {nj*, wj*, q*, l*, pj*, c1j*,.., cJj*} for j=1, …, J 
such that 
(e.1)      {c1j*, …,cJj*} Max U(c1j, …,cJj) s.t. Yj=λjwj*λjn1*c1jT1jp1*+ …+λjcJjnJ*TJjpJ* for 
all j=1,..,J, 
(e.2)                                   {q*} Max pj*q-w*(F+vq), for any j=1,…,J, 
(e.3)                                   q*=λ1cn1*+ …+λJcnJ* for all n=1,…,J and 
(e.4)                                                   (n1*+ …+nJ*)l*=L. 
(e.1) is the optimal consumption of the representative agent in location j. The 
maximization of her utility is subject to a budget condition, where her income can be 
expressed either individually wj or aggregated λjwj. Individual consumption in location i 
of all varieties produced in location j is denoted by njcji. (e.2) is the level of production by 
11 
 
any firm. The assumptions of the model allow one to obtain q* irrespective of the price 
and wage associated with a particular variety. (e.3) is the equilibrium condition in the 
product market and (e.4) is the equilibrium condition in the labor market. 
The model does not have a closed-form solution. For j = 1, …,J the equilibrium 
must satisfy the following system of Jx2 non-linear equations instead: 



















sj TwG  
and 


















sj GTYw  
(6) represents a price index in location j. (7) is the wage equation, which generates 
zero profits given prices, income and trade costs. Real wages across locations might be 
different. 
The long-run equilibrium 
When real wages are different, labor moves from regions with a low real wage to 
regions that pay higher real wages. Fujita et al. (1999) define 








The labor share dynamics over time for j=1, …, J is 
(9)                                                   .)( jjj    
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When (6) and (7) are satisfied there is no interaction among locations. Put another 
way, it is the (Dixit & Stiglitz, 19977) setting for multiple regions. Then, (9) is added up 
to connect locations by equalizing it to zero. More precisely, under this particular law of 
motion, any initial difference in real wages among regions implies that equation (9) is 




2. Hypotheses on trade openness and city size 
Solving out the model summarized in (6), (7) and (9) does not make economic 
sense because it predicts that the long-run equilibrium will be total concentration in a 
single city if the original population distribution is unequal across locations. In order to 
relate urban agglomeration and trade openness, three assumptions are incorporated. First, 
there are two countries termed, foreign and home. Only one location or city is located in 
the foreign country and J-1 in the home country. Trade among J-1 cities in the home 
country involves the same Samuelson (1952) type trade costs, T. But trade costs between 
a particular city in the home country and the unique city in the foreign country is T0. 
Second, it is assumed that migration is allowed between cities within the home country 
but not across countries. 
Third, a centrifugal force of concentration like a congestion cost is included. 
(Krugman & Livas, 1996) consider that labor is not thoroughly effective because agents 
incur commuting costs. The available labor in one city given , is 
                                                          
16 By using discrete choice theory the size of regions may depend upon other factors different from monetary (wage) 
considerations. Particularly, there are two departures to explain migration. One, is to assume taste heterogeneity among 
workers, Murata (2003). The other, is to assume that regions exhibit several features like (Tabuchi & Thisse, 2002).  
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(10)                                                 ).5.01( jjj LLZ   
However, there are other ways to model congestions costs by directly reducing real 
wages. Fujita et al. (1999) use a non linear congestion diseconomy to the city size. Then, 
real wages are defined as 










where  is a congestion parameter. 
A particular case 
In this paper, Fujita´s et al. (1999) model is specified in terms of one city in the 
foreign country and 3 in the home country.
 17
 The value of the parameters are L0 = 2 
(population in the foreign city), L1 + L2 + L3 = 1, δ = 0.1, σ = 5 and T = 1.25. The 
distribution of the population over time and across domestic cities is represented in the 
unit simplex in figures 1 and 2. What happens in the foreign city is neglected because the 
size never changes.  
In both figures, the center represents equal distribution of the population across 
cities. Points (0, 0), (0.5, 0.86) and (1, 0) mean that the whole domestic population is 
concentrated in cities 1, 2 or 3, respectively. The middle point between the line that joins 
points (0, 0) and (0.5, 0.86) means that total population is equally divided between cities 
1 and 2. In these figures, the initial point of an arrow is a point which represents a short-
term equilibrium given a particular distribution of the population. This means that real 
                                                          
17 In the Fujita´s et al. (1999) model there are J locations, however, for exposition reasons J=3: two local cities and one 
foreign city.  
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wages might be different across cities, then labor immigration is expected to generate a 
new distribution. The length of the arrow represents the magnitude of labor movements 
over time across cities (Δλ1, Δλ2, Δλ3) and the direction represents the sign of these 
changes (Δλj≥0 or Δλj<0).  
Figure 1 shows that for high levels of international trade costs (T0 = 1.9), partial 
concentration in one city is a stable long-run equilibrium. It should be pointed out that 
concentration in one city is not total because a small fraction of the total population is 
distributed across the rest of the cities. Equal distribution between three or two cities 
implies an unstable equilibrium. Internal and international trade takes place and all 
varieties produced in the economy are consumed in all cities. The main city produces a 
large variety of goods and the secondary cities produce a limited variety of goods and 
trade between cities is balanced. Figure 2 shows that the equal distribution of population 
in the domestic country is a stable long-run equilibrium for high levels of trade openness. 
Partial concentration in one or two cities is unstable.  
Figures 1 & 2 
With high international trade costs, both firms and workers, by emphasizing their 
expenditure on national goods magnify the market size effects of agglomeration through 
prices and nominal wages. In other words, an extra worker in a particular city represents 
a higher demand and such a benefit always offsets fiercer competition in the labor 
market. Thus, equilibrium is reached when congestion costs are high enough to prevent 
further agglomeration. For lower trade costs (T0 = 1) imports weight in agents’ 
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expenditure is large enough such that any deviation from the dispersed equilibrium is 
associated with weak market size effects. 
Despite the fact that NEG models are highly stylized, their results are quite 
compelling. Furthermore, adding one domestic city to Fujita et al. (1999) allows a richer 
model in order to consider the following hypotheses to be tested: 
Hypothesis 1: Trade openness reduces the size of main cities and increases the size 
of secondary cities. 
Hypothesis 2: Trade openness reduces the size of the main city and increases the 
size of secondary cities given that these cities represent a substantial fraction of the urban 
population. 
Hypothesis 3: Trade openness reduces the size of the main city and increases the 
size of secondary cities given that these are heavily populated. 
Hypothesis 1 cannot be theoretically established with two cities in the home 
country because the population in the secondary city is the residual from the main city. In 
the case of 3 cities, trade openness predicts competition for workers between cities 
instead, due to their incentives to take advantage of agglomeration. Hypothesis 2 is based 
on the fact that secondary cities may have some degree of primacy although the main city 
is overwhelmingly huge. Hypothesis 3 is generated by the lack of implications of the size 
of the urban population: the model works for any size. For example, given the parameters 
used in figure 1 (high trade costs: T0=1.9), most of the population is not entirely 
unexpected to live in one city as it happens to be the case in Dublin or San Jose. The 
16 
 
model does not work, for example, for India because in equilibrium hundreds of million 
people would be expected to live in Bombay.  
 
3. Model specification and method of estimation 
As (Behrens & Thisse, 2007) suggest spatial econometrics is a road in empirical 
regional economics. Nevertheless, they claim that its application to multi-regional trading 
is “practically non-existent”. For this reason among others, in this section we propose 3 
basic specifications to test the hypotheses set out in section 2. The first one is linear, 
cross-sectional, and first order dependences are incorporated as a regressor in the form of 
a spatially lagged dependent variable, because cities in the model are interconnected, 
their size is determined simultaneously within a country. The first model, referred to as 
spatial lag, is expressed as: 
(12)                                                Y = X +  WY + , 
where Y is a nx1 vector of observations of the dependent variable. X is a nxk matrix of 
observations on k exogenous variables. W is a nxn the spatial weights matrix of known 
constants.  is a nx1 vector of i.i.d error terms.  a kx1 vector of regression coefficients.  
is a scalar autoregressive parameter. The spatial lag term WY is correlated with , 
therefore it must be treated as an endogenous variable. W captures the spatial 
interdependence underlying in figures 1 and 2.The second specification is given by 
defining a particular spatial structure for the disturbance terms. Hence, 




(14)                                                       = W + . 
where  is an i.i.d random variable and  is the spatial autoregressive coefficient for the 
error lag W.18 (13) is referred to as the spatial error model. This model is applied when 
the political divisions do not match economic divisions. The third specification assumes 
 = 0 in (12). We also carried out estimations of the panel data versions of (12) and (13), 
see Elhorst (2003), where the general form is usually written as: 
(15)                                              Yt = Xt +  WYt + t 
and 
(16)                                                 t = Wt + t. 




, where dij is the distance between city i 
and j.  and  are parameters equal to one. bij is equal to one if cities i and j belong to the 
same country and equal to zero otherwise. 
(12) and (13) are not specified directly from theory due to the non-linearities that 
arise from the assumptions on preferences that impede an analytical solution. Following 
Anselin (1999, 2003), (12) and (13) partially capture the behavior of NEG models. By 
assuming that both sorts of innovations,  and , are distributed as a N(0,2I) the three 
models can be estimated by applying the method of maximum likelihood from (Anselin 
& Bera, 1998). The linear and spatial lag models estimates are obtained by using our own 
programs in MATLAB and the spatial error lag model by using James Le Sage’s web 
18 
 
page programs. OLS estimates from the first model will be biased and inconsistent, and 
inefficient from the second model. Y is a vector of the values of the log of city size. The 
estimation strategy associated with testing the first hypothesis covers the five most 
important cities in 84 countries. In this case, every country has the same number of 
observations. The second hypothesis is tested using a sample consisting of cities whose 
size represents a fraction larger than 0.05 of the urban population. To test the third 
hypothesis, the sample is selected in terms of absolute population. It consists of cities 
with a population over a million. Hence the number of observations across countries is 
not equal to test these last two hypotheses. Some countries have just one observation like 
Costa Rica or Ireland and others have many observations like the U.S. or Brazil. The 
estimation is for the 1970-1985 and 1985-2000 periods, and panel data with time fixed 
effects. By invoking Zipf’s (1949) law, samples 1 and 3 might be very similar if countries 
main city size were equal.
19
 
We carry out tests for spatial dependence using the Rao score criterion. In the first 
model the null hypotheses are H0: = 0 (RS) and H0: = 0 in the presence of local 
misspecification involving spatial-dependent error process (RS*). In the second model 
the null hypotheses are H0:  = 0 (RS) and H0:  = 0 in the presence of local 
misspecification involving spatial lag dependence (RS*). A third test is also carried out 
for both models where the null hypothesis is H0:  = 0 and  = 0 (RS). We also obtain 
the value of the log-likelihood function as goodness of fit. These class of tests only 
require estimation of the model under the null and also allow for the distinction between 
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 This process is referred to as spatial autoregressive. 
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a spatial error and a spatial lag alternative. These tests are also implemented using own 
MATLAB routines. All of them are converge in distribution as a 2(1). 
 
4. Trade openness definitions 
NEG models specifically define international trade openness as low international 
trade costs, which are an abstraction of transport costs, tariffs, subsidies, taxes, non-tariff 
barriers, etc. Empirically, then, what are the variables associated with trade openness? 
Are these variables correlated? Do high trade volumes mean trade openness?
20
 
Yanikkaya (2003) points out that this definition is not unique and has evolved over time 
from “one extreme to another”. On the one hand, trade liberalization can be achieved by 
lowering the degree by which the protective structure in a country is biased against 
exports. For example, subsidizing exports or encouraging export schemes. According to 
this definition an open economy could have very high import tariffs in order to foster 
import substitution. On the other hand, Harrison (1996) considers that trade openness is 
linked to the idea of neutrality, the indifference between earning a unit of foreign 
exchange by exporting and saving a unit of foreign exchange through import substitution. 
Back to Yanikkaya (2003), trade openness can be divided into four categories. 
First, trade shares in GDP (imports plus exports over GDP). Second, trade barriers that 
include average tariff rates, export taxes, total taxes on international trade and indices of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 Zipf’s law states that the number of cities with a population larger than S is approximately proportional to S-p , where 
the p is close to 1. 
20 (Rodríguez & Rodrik, 2000) claim that trade openness indicators have been problematic as measures of trade 
barriers. For example, “simple tariff averages underweight high tariff rates because the corresponding import levels 
tend to be low”. Pritchett (1996) addresses the implications of different indicators of trade policy stance to capture a 
common element that foster growth. 
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non tariff barriers. According to Baldwin (1989), the former falls under the category of an 
outcome-based measure and the latter under an incidence-based measure. Third, bilateral 
payments arrangements (BPAs) as a measure of trade orientation. A BPA is an agreement 
that describes the general method of settlement of trade balances between two countries. 
Fourth, the exchange rate black market premium is the most commonly used measure to 
show the severity of trade restrictions. Nevertheless, it measures a combination of bad 
policies rather than being a reference to just trade policy. 
It is worth mentioning that (Limão & Venables, 2001) show that trade costs do not 
depend only on artificial or administrative barriers as Yanikkaya (2003) states, but also 
on countries´ geography and on their level of infrastructure. Remote and landlocked 
countries trade less than coastal economies. Countries with a poor transport and 
communications infrastructure have limited participation in global trade. 
Earlier empirical work on the cross-country relationship between city size and trade 
openness does not take into account the implications of using different definitions of 
trade openness, where trade share in GDP and import barriers have been the standard 
measures.
21
 In this paper, three other measures are used: weighted share of trade with the 
U.S.; and the share of trade with Japan, Germany and the U.S. jointly; and an 
instrumental variable. 
5. Data 
                                                          
21 (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2004) survey the measurement of trade costs. They acknowledge that tariffs are less 
important than other policies. 
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The data set covers information on 84 countries over two time periods: 1970-1985 
as in (Ades & Glaeser, 1995) and Nitsch (2003), and 1985-2000 as in Nitsch (2003).
22
 
Table 11 shows the cities used in this paper. Both the dependent and explanatory 
variables for period t are constructed by averaging observations over 5 year intervals. For 
example, the 1970-1985 period averages information for the years 1970, 1975, 1980 and 
1985. However, for some variables information is not always available for all years.  
Three sample criteria are applied to validate the hypotheses of this paper. The first 
sample consists of the 5 most populous cities in 2000, and consists of 355 observations. 
This ranking is invariable over time with the exception of two countries. Holland’s main 
city in the period 1970-1985 was Rotterdam and Amsterdam in the 1985-2000 period. 
Syria’s main city in the former period was Aleppo and Damascus in the latter period. In 
both periods the largest city is Tokyo and the smallest one is Tipitapa in Nicaragua in the 
1970-1985 period. The second contains information on 224 cities with a population over 
a million in 2000. Faridabad in India and Sana’a in Yemen are the smallest cities of the 
sample for the first and second period, respectively. The third sample contains 183 cities 
that represent a fraction larger than 0.05 with regard to urban population in 2000. African 
cities are the smallest cities in this sample. 
Table 1. 
Information at the country level changes for three countries: Germany, Yemen and 
Ethiopia. The first two countries experienced a process of unification, West and East 
                                                          
22 (Ades & Glaeser´s, 1995) sample covers 85 countries; however, in the appendix only 84 countries are listed. In 
addition, former European communist countries are not included because their size heavily depended upon central 
planner decisions, see (Clayton & Richardson, 1989). In the case of China, from 1953 to 1978 industrial location 
depended upon three principles: geographical proximity to mountains, dispersion and concealment, see Wen (2004). 
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Germany, and South and North Yemen; and the last one split into Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
For the first period, information on West Germany, South Yemen and Ethiopia is used. In 
the second period, information for these “new” countries is used.23 For panel data 
estimation these countries are not included. Some countries do not have complete 
information on their most important cities. For example, there is only information for one 
city in Costa Rica. Furthermore, information on cities is not clearly defined. A natural 
question is what are the city bounds? For example, in the case of Germany or Japan there 
is information on a system of cities that jointly are considered as a single city. In other 
words the political or administrative divisions do not coincide with the actual economic 
bounds. This is considered a nuisance in spatial econometrics. For that reason, we assume 
in one of the model specifications a stochastic process in the spatial error structure. The 
OECD dummy excludes Turkey and Mexico because they are outliers in terms of income 
and other economic and social indicators. The central location dummy is 1 when the 
distance between the city and the country’s central point is less than the square root of the 
land area. Dummies related to central location and access by sea are important 
determinants of agglomeration as natural advantages of locations, see Kim (1999) and 
(Ellison & Glaeser, 1999). The lack of political rights and civil liberties dummy is 1 
when each component is above 3.5, and 0 otherwise. The road index denotes the ratio of 
road network over the square root of land area.  
We use five definitions of trade openness: share of trade in GDP (STG); weighted 
by distance share of trade with the U.S. in GDP (WUS); share of trade with Japan, the 
U.S. and Germany (JUG); import duties as a fraction of total imports (ID), and an 
                                                          
23 Eritrea is neglected in this sample. 
23 
 
instrumental variable (IV). The weights related to bilateral trade with the U.S. are the 
distance between the centers of the U.S. and the corresponding country. Therefore, a 
dollar exported (imported) to (from) Canada has less weight than a dollar exported 
(imported) to (from) Australia. Trade with Japan, the U.S. and Germany is not weighted 
by distance because it is assumed that they are equidistant and their volume of trade is 
similar.
24
 The instrumental variable is constructed by following Frankel and Romer’s, 
(1999) estimation strategy and information of bilateral trade between 165 countries (see 
appendix 2.2). This is a way to overcome endogeneity problems that arise from the 
correlation between the error term and the trade openness variable. Telephone mainlines 
is a proxy variable of information technologies (IT).  
The main data sources are the U. N. Prospects of World Urbanization, World Bank 
Indicators, The CIA World Factbook, Vernon Henderson´s Web page, Freedom in the 
World, and Yanikkaya (2003) and John Helliwell´s bilateral trade data set. See table 13 
for details. 
Stylized facts on trade openness and urbanization 
In figure 3, we observe a clear positive correlation between exports of goods and 
services as percentage of GDP and urban population as percentage of total population at 
world level. From 19970 to 1985 the former variable change from 13 percent to 25 
percent, the later from 36 percent to 47 percent. Currently, most people live in urban 
areas. 
6. Results 
                                                          
24 For observations related to cities from Japan, Germany and the U.S., trade information with economies of similar 
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The results from estimating (12), (13) and (15) with and without spatial 
dependence are reported in tables 2-10. The analysis is conducted by sample. 
Sample 1: main cities 
By construction, there is no spatial dependence regarding the sample consisting of 
only main cities around the world. In this case, (12) given  = 0 is estimated by OLS and 
the results are reported in column 1 of tables 2-5. The must noteworthy results are that a 
10 percent increase in the share of trade in GDP reduces city size by 6.6 and 5.3 percent 
in the 1970-1985 and 1985-2000 periods, respectively. However, both estimates are not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, panel data estimates show that a 10 percent 
share of trade of GDP causes a city size reduction by 5.6 per cent. In the first period, lack 
of political rights and civil liberties on average increase the size of a city by 28 percent 
and they are 39 percent larger if they are capitals, and similar results arise for the 1985-
2000 period, however, these coefficients show a lower value. Both sort of variables 
respectively summarize political instability and rent seeking opportunities. In sum, the 
Ades and Glaeser, and Henderson (1974) results are confirmed.  
The OECD main cities are smaller in both periods, which might suggest that a 
higher level of taste heterogeneity in OECD countries attenuates urban agglomeration as 
Murata (2003) suggests. Cities of OECD countries are 25 percent smaller. There is 
evidence that main cities’ size is positively related to nonurbanized population outside of 
the city. This could be explained by agricultural workers flowing to cities as (Gaviria & 
Stein; 2000), Puga, (1998) and (Picard & Zeng, 2005) claim. With respect to geographic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
size of these countries is used, respectively.  
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variables, main cities at ports or close to the center of the country are expected to be 
larger. In both periods, cities’ size reaction to trade openness is slightly positive if they 
fall within the port category, which is consistent with (Fujita & Mori, 1996). And their 
reaction is negative if the city is close to the center, which concides with Hanson’s (1998) 
results and the (Frankel & Romer’s, 1999) rationale. The variable related to IT indicates 
that by doubling up the telephone lines per 1000 people, city size increases by 22 and 32 
percent in each period respectively. It is worth pointing out that within the regional 
science literature there is no a consensus on the effects of IT on urban structure, see Sohn 
et al. (2002). When using panel data main cities are on average 13 percent larger in the 
second period. Only under this sample the log of urbanized population outside the city is 
taken as an explanatory variable because in the other models the equivalent to this 
variable is WY. 
Sample 2: the five largest cities.  
The estimates without assuming spatial dependence show that city size is positively 
related to trade openness. On the other hand, the impact of international trade on city size 
for different definitions of trade openness barely changes from our benchmark trade 
openness definition. In particular, using STD, WUS, JGU and ID, we find that main cities 
decrease in size and secondary cities increase in size in the both periods as a result of 
openness to trade.
25
 But a higher value of ID for the second period implies that all cities 
increases in size as well. However, using IV the estimation predicts that both main and 
                                                          
25 Recall that higher ID means lower levels of trade openness. 
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secondary cities decrease in size for higher levels of trade openness for the first and 
second periods, and panel data as well. 
MLE is the method of estimation when the sample is selected by city ranking and 
the specification model is spatial lag, whose results are reported in tables 2-5. In sum, a 
10 percent increase in the share of trade in GDP increases the size of top 5 cities by 3 
percent for the 1970-1985 period and 2 percent for the 1985-2000 period, after 
controlling for the main city status. Both main and secondary cities are larger if they have 
access by water. But if they are located close to the center of the country such a condition 
does not have a significant impact on their size. Political liberties and civil rights 
negatively impact on the size of cities in the 1970-1985 period but not in the 1985-2000 
period. It is worth mentioning that countries in Latin America have turned to democratic 
regimes since 1985. Even some OECD countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Korea, 
Turkey and Mexico have noticeably increased their level of civil liberties since the mid-
1970s as well. A positive  can be interpreted as that people leaving the main city went to 
cities of immediate lower ranking as a consequence of international trade. OECD 
countries have smaller cities. Over time cities grew 12 percent. Regarding main cities 
trade openness have a negative net impact on main cities´ size. In the first period a 10 per 
cent increase in trade openness reduce the size approximately 1.7 per cent and 4 percent 
in the second period. 
For the error lag specification, MLE is also the method of estimation. The results 
are similar to the spatial lag specification. Here we focus our attention on the trade 
openness variables. The results are consistent over all definitions except the IV where 
27 
 
secondary cities are negatively related to trade openness. Regarding ID, restrictive 
policies shrinks the size of secondary cities but increases the size of main cities. The 
instrumental variable associated with the 1970-1985 period must be carefully taken 
because it is weakly correlated (0.5) with the actual share of trade in GDP and its 
explanatory power is relatively low (R
2
=0.24).  
Rao tests show that the error lag model is the more appropriate because in the 
Spatial Lag model we fail to reject the null hypothesis  = 0 given   0. Besides we 
reject the null hypothesis  = 0 given   0. This happens to be true with a 0.975 
confidence for all definitions of trade openness in both periods and panel data.  
Tables 2-5 
Sample 3: cities that represent over 5 percent of the urban population 
When the sample includes cities whose population is above 5 percent of the urban 
population the effects of trade openness are not clear. The results of this sample are 
reported in tables 6 and 7. By analyzing the first model the effects of international trade 
openness on city size are mixed over time. For the 1970-1985 period is positive, but 
negative for the second. Lack of political rights and civil liberties positively affects city 
size in both periods. The IT variable little affects city size. A similar pattern is observed 
in the spatial lag model. In the spatial error model trade openness positively affects city 
size except main cities. The coefficient associated with the central location times STG 
dummy is negative in the first period and positive in the second period under the three 
basic specifications. Using other definitions of trade openness, the results are also mixed. 
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The message is that under this sample there is little support for saying anything about 
secondary cities. There is empirical support for a negative impact on main cities.  
Tables 6-7 
Sample 4: cities with a population over a million 
The results related to the sample with cities that have a population over a million in 
2000 are reported in tables 8 and 9. Regarding the linear specification with no spatial 
dependence, main cities reduce their size and secondary cities increase their size if a 
country experiences a process of trade liberalization. A 10 percent increase in the share of 
trade in GDP pushes the population up of cities by around 22 and 13 percent in the first, 
second period, respectively; however, in both periods main cities reduce their size. 
OECD cities are smaller Port and central cities on average are larger. Populous cities are 
more sensitive to trade openness versus the previous samples. These results are 
significant at the 10 per cent level. The lack of political rights and civil liberties 
positively affects the size of cities.  
The results are similar for the spatial lag and spatial error models, however, the 
effects of trade openness on city size are attenuated. With respect to city interaction the 
parameter is not significant. Recall that W is not symmetric at the country level: the 
number of cities in the sample is not equal across countries.  
The results are consistent with different definitions of trade openness except ID and 
WUS. In this case, cities reduce their size for higher levels of trade openness but main 
cities. Regarding the model that fits better, the spatial lag has the maximum likelihood. 




Testing Krugman (1991) 
In table 10, we report the coefficient associated with road index. A higher road 
index implies lower trade costs. Therefore, it positively affects city size as Krugman 
(1991) claims. The estimates are using the second sample (city ranking from 1 to 5) and 
are positive. Again the spatial lag model seems to be the most appropriate due to Rao 
tests results and the value of log – likelihood is the maximum under this model.  
Tables 10 
7. Final remarks 
In the literature there are several ways to explain agglomeration. One of them is 
through non-price interactions where technological externalities are generated in a 
perfectly competitive environment. In the NEG approach, however, it is justified by 
micro foundations where the effects of concentration are transmitted through prices and 
wages. By increasing the degree of openness of an economy the incentives of firms and 
workers to cluster are weakened and a balanced urban system is generated. Several 
predictions of Fujita et al.(1999) have been tested in this paper. The hypothesis that main 
cities reduce in size and secondary cities increase in size can be validated provided that 
they are top ranked. The implication of this result is that poverty, crime, pollution and 
congestion associated with top ranked cities can be partially attacked by fostering 
international trade. Besides, urban planners must pay attention to urban growth in 
secondary cities.  
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For different definitions of trade openness, big cities, in terms of urban primacy are 
not clearly affected by trade openness. The other results related to hypotheses 3 is that 
populous cities are more sensitive to trade because economies of scale play a more 
important role. In this case, results are similar and significant to the sample consisting of 
top ranked cities with the exception of IV. An advantage of assuming spatial dependence 
opens the possibility that cities compete for workers. In this paper, the coefficients related 
to city interaction are positive suggesting that a struggle arises in the labor market. In 
Puga, however, city size is also explained as a result of migration from rural areas. Da 
Mata et al.(2005), for example, find that city growth in Brazil is driven by rural 
population supply and inter-regional transport improvements and spillover effects of 
knowledge accumulation. 
The consequences of using different definitions of trade openness is that those 
related to volumes of trade affect city size but a clear link to tariffs is not robust. One 
answer is that tariffs are biased, in other words, they do not entirely capture real trade 
costs. Another explanation is that tariff elasticities of imports and exports are low. Trade 
deflated by distance is a significant explanatory variable. But joint trade with Germany, 
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1985 27,192 (Tokyo, Jap.)  13 (Tipitapa, Nic.) 463 1,346 
1985-
2000 32,718 (Tokyo, Jap.) 37 (Carnot, C.A.R.) 722 1,821 
Main City 
1970-
1985 27,192 (Tokyo, Jap.) 111 (Kigali, Rw.) 1,005 2,675 
1985-




1985 27,192 (Tokyo, Jap.) 223 (Sana’a, Yem.) 1,126 2085 
1985-
2000 32,718 (Tokyo, Jap.) 706 (Faridabad, Ind) 1,712 2,846 





1985 27,192 (Tokyo, Jap.) 20 (Mzuzu, Mal.) 621 1739 
1985-
2000 32,718 (Tokyo, Jap.)  67 (Mzuzu, Mal.) 988 2,359 
Data source: U.N. Prospects of World Urbanization (2003). 











Dependent variable: Log of city population  1 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5
2.024* -3.855*** -3.913*** -4.123*** -3.295*** -3.604*** -3.443*** -3.307*** -2.431** -3.780*** -3.687*** -4.065*** -2.869*
(1.21) (1.31) (1.16) (1.10) (1.08) (1.22) (1.08) (1.02) (0.99) (1.39) (1.37) (1.37) (1.48)
1.145*** 1.287*** 1.516*** 1.554*** 1.296*** 1.461*** 1.695*** 1.702*** 1.130*** 1.341*** 1.551*** 1.569***
(0.27) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21)
0.390*** 0.646*** 0.603*** 0.580*** 0.601*** 0.711*** 0.659*** 0.653*** 0.677*** 0.680*** 0.606*** 0.607*** 0.652***
(0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
0.242** 0.736*** 0.746*** 0.744*** 0.715*** 0.651*** 0.599*** 0.556*** 0.498*** 0.734*** 0.737*** 0.741*** 0.701***
(0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
-0.027 0.132*** 0.123*** 0.131*** 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.091*** 0.138*** 0.129** 0.139*** 0.130**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.137 0.269** 0.333*** 0.325*** 0.297*** 0.237** 0.280*** 0.241*** 0.198** 0.262** 0.317*** 0.307*** 0.266**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
0.845* 2.246*** 1.926*** 1.795*** 1.654*** 2.001*** 1.510*** 1.381*** 1.192*** 2.278*** 1.972*** 1.888*** 1.727***
(0.46) (0.47) (0.41) (0.39) (0.36) (0.46) (0.40) (0.37) (0.34) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
-0.667 0.852 0.497 0.740* 0.418 0.774 0.393 0.642* 0.308 0.686 0.296 0.661 0.229
(0.51) (0.58) (0.42) (0.41) (0.37) (0.54) (0.38) (0.37) (0.34) (0.57) (0.44) (0.43) (0.41)
-0.490 -0.421 -0.471 -0.383 -0.562 -0.537 -0.613 -0.472 -0.501 -0.523 -0.572 -0.471
(0.47) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.38) (0.35) (0.37) (0.36)
0.098 0.755** 0.419* 0.397 0.391* 0.711** 0.351 0.324 0.343 0.659** 0.308 0.292 0.342
(0.28) (0.31) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.28) (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.29) (0.25) (0.24) (0.22)
0.153 -1.079** -0.787* -0.806* -0.652 -0.974** -0.611 -0.622 -0.499 -0.841 -0.474 -0.514 -0.358
(0.52) (0.53) (0.44) (0.44) (0.41) (0.50) (0.40) (0.41) (0.38) (0.53) (0.44) (0.43) (0.39)
0.245 0.037 -0.211 0.013 0.044 -0.001 -0.251 -0.002 0.029 -0.002 -0.257 0.037 0.025
(0.28) (0.30) (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.28) (0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.29) (0.23) (0.22) (0.20)
-0.285 -0.095 0.154 -0.184 0.005 -0.017 0.265 -0.133 0.030 0.016 0.359 -0.141 0.103
(0.50) (0.54) (0.42) (0.41) (0.38) (0.50) (0.39) (0.38) (0.34) (0.51) (0.40) (0.40) (0.36)
0.286* 0.005 -0.101 -0.179 -0.254* -0.017 -0.093 -0.143 -0.195 -0.003 -0.118 -0.191 -0.289
(0.15) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
-0.246 -0.299 -0.381** -0.355** -0.302* -0.260 -0.297* -0.270 -0.203 -0.287 -0.359 -0.336 -0.263
(0.19) (0.22) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.21) (0.18) (0.17) (0.15) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
0.032 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.003 -0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.003
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.454***
(0.09)
0.115 0.199 0.252 0.300
(2.09) (3.60) (4.71) (5.77)
0.138 0.242 0.282 0.366
(2.45) (4.24) (5.02) (6.96)
RSrho 3.77 11.42 23.70 36.01
RS*rho 0.90 0.89 0.02 1.64
RSlambda 4.89 15.48 27.31 50.99
RS*lambda 2.01 4.94 3.63 16.63
RSlambdarho 5.78 16.36 27.33 52.64 5.78 16.36 27.33 52.64
Log-likelihood -35.96 -139.06 -200.17 -269.79 -323.88 -136.59 -194.18 -259.27 -308.90 -135.90 -191.87 -257.49 -302.89
R2 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.80 0.78
Number of obsevations 84 152 207 260 305 152 207 260 305 152 207 260 305
Table 2. Cities by ranking  (1970-1985 )
19) City interaction parameter (lambda )
13) Central location dummy x share of trade in GDP
14) Lack of political rights and civl liberties dummy
15) OECD country dummy
16) Log of telephone mainlines (per 1000 people)
17) Log of urbanized population
18) City interaction parameter (rho )
1) Intercept
2 Main city dummy
3) Capital city dummy
4) Log of nonurbanized population
5) Log of land area
6) Log of real GDP per capita
7) Share of the labor force outside the agriculture
Standard deviation reported below the estimated coefficients. ***significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
OLS Lag-ML Err-ML
8.1) Share of trade in GDP
9.1) Share of trade in GDP x main city dummy
10) Port city dummy
11) Port city dummy x share of trade in GDP




Dependent variable: Log of city population  1 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5
2.752*** -2.687** -2.409** -2.924*** -3.067*** -2.678*** -2.072** -2.111*** -2.088*** -2.591** -1.975* -2.594** -2.470**
(1.04) (1.05) (0.96) (0.88) (0.86) (0.95) (0.88) (0.80) (0.77) (1.16) (1.17) (1.16) (1.25)
1.171*** 1.331*** 1.611*** 1.681*** 1.361*** 1.508*** 1.814*** 1.855*** 1.106*** 1.409*** 1.653*** 1.699***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
0.313** 0.536*** 0.541*** 0.501*** 0.545*** 0.632*** 0.612*** 0.588*** 0.636*** 0.645*** 0.584*** 0.562*** 0.638***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
0.165* 0.603*** 0.610*** 0.612*** 0.614*** 0.509*** 0.471*** 0.424*** 0.400*** 0.596*** 0.595*** 0.600*** 0.600***
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
0.015 0.165*** 0.144*** 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.145*** 0.118*** 0.111*** 0.105*** 0.172*** 0.148*** 0.162*** 0.160***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.239** 0.428*** 0.465*** 0.456*** 0.481*** 0.362*** 0.362*** 0.307*** 0.276*** 0.416*** 0.432*** 0.419*** 0.410***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
0.033 1.075** 0.956** 0.868** 0.645** 0.895** 0.760** 0.688** 0.602* 1.122** 1.069** 1.022** 0.888*
(0.41) (0.44) (0.39) (0.37) (0.35) (0.41) (0.37) (0.34) (0.31) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.51)
-0.535 0.959* 0.179 0.461 0.294 0.944** 0.125 0.366 0.207 0.899 -0.050 0.295 0.084
(0.48) (0.50) (0.34) (0.33) (0.31) (0.45) (0.31) (0.30) (0.27) (0.49) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34)
-0.411 -0.389 -0.502 -0.487 -0.494 -0.488 -0.653* -0.607* -0.438* -0.556** -0.650** -0.643**
(0.35) (0.35) (0.37) (0.37) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34) (0.33) (0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.28)
0.279 0.929*** 0.349 0.396* 0.321 0.863*** 0.271 0.301 0.257 0.876*** 0.224 0.276 0.306
(0.27) (0.28) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.26) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.27) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20)
-0.147 -1.333*** -0.693** -0.846** -0.689** -1.185*** -0.487 -0.575* -0.420 -1.140*** -0.327 -0.438 -0.299
(0.42) (0.41) (0.34) (0.36) (0.34) (0.37) (0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.41) (0.33) (0.34) (0.31)
0.041 0.161 -0.205 -0.016 -0.001 0.167 -0.210 -0.035 -0.019 0.236 -0.217 0.003 -0.065
(0.26) (0.28) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.26) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.27) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21)
0.006 -0.248 0.149 -0.060 0.065 -0.257 0.174 -0.034 0.067 -0.370 0.255 -0.040 0.175
(0.37) (0.40) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.39) (0.31) (0.34) (0.31)
0.242 0.334 0.379* 0.461** 0.484*** 0.280 0.280 0.289* 0.270* 0.338 0.364 0.433* 0.398
(0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
-0.381* -0.346 -0.373 -0.290 -0.256 -0.271 -0.265 -0.204 -0.142 -0.296 -0.303 -0.226 -0.194
(0.22) (0.27) (0.25) (0.23) (0.21) (0.25) (0.23) (0.21) (0.19) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30)
0.022 0.006 0.020 0.040 0.037 0.000 0.008 0.022 0.022 0.001 0.016 0.033 0.030
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
0.455***
(0.09)
0.159 0.224 0.297 0.349
(2.94) (4.15) (5.83) (7.13)
0.209 0.291 0.348 0.425
(3.81) (5.32) (6.64) (8.74)
RSrho 6.70 13.75 29.16 44.57
RS*rho 2.24 2.41 0.10 1.14
RSlambda 9.09 20.43 36.10 61.18
RS*lambda 4.63 9.09 7.04 17.76
RSlambdarho 11.33 22.84 36.20 62.32 11.33 22.84 36.20 62.32
Log-likelihood -34.46 -134.01 -194.79 -257.75 -309.69 -129.78 -187.40 -243.75 -289.84 -128.06 -183.11 -239.79 -281.49
R2 0.86 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.76
Number of obsevations 84 152 207 260 305 152 207 260 305 152 207 260 305
Table 3. Cities by ranking  (1985-2000 )
16) Log of telephone mainlines (per 1000 people)
17) Log of urbanized population
18) City interaction parameter (rho )
19) City interaction parameter (lambda )
Standard deviation reported below the estimated coefficients. ***significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
12) Central location dummy
13) Central location dummy x share of trade in GDP
14) Lack of political rights and civl liberties dummy
15) OECD country dummy
6) Log of real GDP per capita
7) Share of the labor force outside the agriculture
8.1) Share of trade in GDP
9.1) Share of trade in GDP x main city dummy
10) Port city dummy
11) Port city dummy x share of trade in GDP
3) Capital city dummy
1) Intercept
2 Main city dummy
4) Log of nonurbanized population





Dependent variable: Log of city population  1 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5
2.520*** -3.100 -2.906 -3.197 -2.904 -2.982*** -2.542*** -2.420*** -2.084*** -2.990*** -2.564*** -3.003*** -2.446***
(0.75) (3.90) (4.01) (4.70) (4.39) (0.75) (0.68) (0.63) (0.61) (0.88) (0.90) (0.90) (0.94)
1.137 1.281 1.545 1.605 1.319*** 1.457*** 1.735*** 1.765*** 1.101*** 1.349*** 1.583*** 1.626***
(6.38) (7.44) (8.54) (8.84) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
0.330*** 0.591 0.564 0.534 0.561 0.674*** 0.629*** 0.613*** 0.641*** 0.655*** 0.588*** 0.571*** 0.625***
(0.09) (5.37) (5.48) (5.01) (5.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
0.201*** 0.674 0.679 0.678 0.668 0.577*** 0.530*** 0.482*** 0.449*** 0.668*** 0.665*** 0.668*** 0.653***
(0.06) (17.61) (19.71) (21.08) (22.32) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.008 0.147 0.131 0.138 0.133 0.131*** 0.109*** 0.104*** 0.096*** 0.154*** 0.137*** 0.149*** 0.142***
(0.03) (4.52) (4.49) (5.02) (5.16) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.160** 0.298 0.352 0.347 0.342 0.255*** 0.282*** 0.238*** 0.207*** 0.285*** 0.325*** 0.317*** 0.295***
(0.07) (3.88) (5.21) (5.57) (6.00) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
0.328 1.606 1.367 1.254 1.032 1.377*** 1.068*** 0.969*** 0.829*** 1.654*** 1.459*** 1.388*** 1.195***
(0.30) (4.97) (4.77) (4.60) (4.10) (0.31) (0.28) (0.26) (0.23) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36)
-0.563* 0.858 0.273 0.513 0.325 0.817** 0.207 0.434* 0.246 0.764** 0.070 0.410 0.151
(0.32) (2.40) (1.07) (2.04) (1.41) (0.34) (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.36) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26)
-0.407 -0.342 -0.431 -0.383 -0.486* -0.442* -0.568** -0.481* -0.427** -0.483** -0.546** -0.504**
(1.49) (1.28) (1.52) (1.35) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22)
0.203 0.830 0.386 0.412 0.368 0.774*** 0.315** 0.323** 0.306** 0.770*** 0.274* 0.294* 0.331**
(0.18) (4.36) (2.33) (2.43) (2.32) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
-0.035 -1.198 -0.736 -0.826 -0.684 -1.067*** -0.547** -0.596** -0.469** -1.012*** -0.398 -0.476* -0.350
(0.29) (3.97) (2.87) (3.03) (2.68) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.31) (0.26) (0.27) (0.24)
0.156 0.081 -0.223 -0.038 0.006 0.067 -0.231 -0.033 0.013 0.118 -0.225 0.016 -0.001
(0.17) (0.41) (1.38) (0.23) (0.04) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14)
-0.167 -0.184 0.148 -0.068 0.031 -0.154 0.201 -0.056 0.023 -0.213 0.279 -0.077 0.101
(0.26) (0.60) (0.58) (0.26) (0.13) (0.29) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.31) (0.24) (0.26) (0.23)
0.262** 0.141 0.090 0.071 0.054 0.108 0.055 0.029 0.009 0.134 0.065 0.051 0.006
(0.11) (1.06) (0.75) (0.65) (0.54) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
-0.286** -0.327 -0.417 -0.394 -0.356 -0.270* -0.307** -0.275** -0.213* -0.295 -0.367** -0.346* -0.297*
(0.14) (1.95) (2.79) (2.85) (2.82) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
0.066* 0.048 0.051 0.058 0.062 0.036 0.031 0.036 0.034 0.043 0.046 0.051 0.049
(0.03) (1.23) (1.52) (1.87) (2.17) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.455***
(0.06)
0.131* 0.188 0.192 0.169 0.178 0.164** 0.158** 0.125** 0.125** 0.193** 0.199** 0.170* 0.188**
(0.07) (2.40) (2.73) (2.53) (2.85) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
0.146 0.219 0.282 0.325
(3.72) (5.58) (7.49) (8.89)
0.175 0.282 0.326 0.388
(4.36) (7.07) (8.38) (10.47)
RSrho 11.29 25.37 54.41 77.64
RS*rho 2.55 3.37 0.03 3.40
RSlambda 14.62 36.42 65.15 110.08
RS*lambda 5.88 14.42 10.77 35.83
RSlambdarho 17.17 39.79 65.18 113.47 17.17 39.79 65.18 113.47
Log-likelihood -68.85 -265.77 -382.31 -510.85 -605.73 -259.30 -369.18 -486.39 -572.76 -257.15 -362.61 -480.97 -559.21
R2 0.89 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.77
Number of obsevations 162 292 396 496 580 292 396 496 580 292 396 496 580
Table 4. Cities by ranking  (panel data: 1970-1985, 1985-2000)
12) Central location dummy
9.1) Share of trade in GDP x main city dummy
10) Port city dummy
17) Log of urbanized population
18) 1985-2000 dummy
5) Log of land area
6) Log of real GDP per capita
13) Central location dummy x share of trade in GDP
15) OECD country dummy
16) Log of telephone mainlines (per 1000 people)
14) Lack of political rights and civl liberties dummy
7) Share of the labor force outside the agriculture
8.1) Share of trade in GDP
11) Port city dummy x share of trade in GDP
Standard deviation reported below the estimated coefficients. ***significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
OLS Lag-ML Err-ML
19) City interaction parameter (rho )
4) Log of nonurbanized population
3) Capital city dummy
2 Main city dummy
1) Intercept




Dependent variable: Log of city population 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data
0.418 0.294 0.325 0.308 0.207 0.246 0.234 0.083 0.146
(0.37) (0.31) (0.23) (0.34) (0.27) (0.21) (0.41) (0.34) (0.26)
-0.383 -0.487 -0.383 -0.472 -0.607* -0.481* -0.469 -0.643** -0.507**
(0.44) (0.37) (0.28) (0.41) (0.33) (0.26) (0.36) (0.28) (0.22)
0.300 0.349 0.325 0.357 0.431 0.394
(5.77) (7.13) (8.89) (6.72) (8.94) (10.72)
RSrho 36.0 44.57 77.64
RS*rho 1.64 1.14 3.40
RSlambda 50.99 61.18 110.08
RS*lambda 16.63 17.76 35.83
RSlambdarho 52.64 62.32 113.47 52.64 62.32 113.47
Log-likelihood -323.880 -309.690 -605.730 -308.90 -289.84 -572.76 -302.88 -281.50 -559.14
R2 0.778 0.764 0.770
Number of obsevations 305 305 580 305 305 580 305 305 580
201.290 290.650 784.350 156.600 106.940 419.980 586.880 24.832 629.240
(663.78) (385.30) (630.56) (608.86) (343.14) (577.45) (733.84) (412.99) (678.44)
-667.280 -278.540 -699.970 -689.100 -388.510 -854.250 -681.110 -464.410 -945.410
(846.85) (473.53) (781.59) (775.81) (421.34) (714.14) (684.18) (355.57) (618.48)
0.293 0.356 0.325 0.365 0.441 0.401
(5.59) (7.27) (8.86) (6.93) (9.28) (11.01)
RSrho 34.03 47.01 78.45
RS*rho 1.78 1.52 5.07
RSlambda 48.32 64.23 112.81
RS*lambda 16.07 18.74 39.43
RSlambdarho 50.10 65.74 117.88 50.10 65.74 117.88
Log-likelihood -323.56 -313.17 -608.27 -309.39 -292.50 -575.28 -303.26 -283.06 -560.32
R2 0.78 0.76 0.77
Number of obsevations 305 305 580 305 305 580 305 305 580
-0.656 0.314 0.581** -0.336 0.301 0.469* -0.368 0.159 0.508
(0.46) (0.28) (0.29) (0.42) (0.25) (0.26) (0.55) (0.36) (0.37)
-1.160 -0.775 -0.744 -1.174 -0.817* -0.815* -1.053 -0.675* -0.726*
(0.83) (0.49) (0.52) (0.76) (0.44) (0.47) (0.70) (0.39) (0.41)
0.295 0.355 0.328 0.355 0.425 0.399
(5.65) (7.25) (8.99) (6.66) (8.74) (10.92)
RSrho 34.08 46.86 80.51
RS*rho 1.76 0.36 4.20
RSlambda 48.60 59.83 114.25
RS*lambda 16.28 13.33 37.93
RSlambdarho 50.36 60.19 118.45 50.36 60.19 118.45
Log-likelihood -323.12 -312.02 -608.83 -308.82 -291.42 -575.01 -302.79 -283.84 -561.26
R2 0.78 0.76 0.77
Number of obsevations 305 305 580 305 305 580 305 305 580
-0.225 0.235 0.055 -0.099 0.450 0.191 -0.520 -0.223 -0.256
(1.18) (1.09) (0.81) (1.09) (0.98) (0.74) (1.36) (1.32) (0.95)
2.138* 2.455** 2.026** 2.316** 2.541** 2.130*** 2.144** 2.360*** 1.942***
(1.25) (1.16) (0.87) (1.14) (1.04) (0.80) (1.03) (0.92) (0.71)
0.285 0.332 0.313 0.352 0.411 0.375
(5.12) (6.23) (8.00) (6.25) (7.87) (9.50)
RSrho 28.88 36.09 67.23
RS*rho 0.31 0.19 1.71
RSlambda 37.76 45.77 90.35
RS*lambda 9.19 9.86 24.84
RSlambdarho 38.07 45.96 92.06 38.07 45.96 92.06
Log-likelihood -290.51 -276.16 -552.84 -278.40 -260.18 -524.91 -273.95 -254.19 -514.18
R2 0.79 0.78 0.78
Number of obsevations 275 275 530 275 275 530 275 275 530
-3.111 -1.739 -1.978 -1.852** -1.118 -1.121 -2.888 -2.165 -2.116
(1.43) (1.12) (1.60) (0.92) (0.79) (0.97) (1.11) (1.15) (1.46)
-1.071 -1.318 -0.956 -1.367** -1.546 -1.190 -1.143 -1.436 -1.266
(0.42) (0.74) (0.66) (0.58) (0.95) (0.89) (0.54) (1.02) (1.09)
0.271 0.318 0.296 0.334 0.402 0.365
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
RSrho 25.66 36.03 60.29
RS*rho 0.98 0.09 0.98
RSlambda 36.84 46.38 83.44
RS*lambda 12.16 10.43 23.92
RSlambdarho 37.82 46.47 83.31 37.82 46.47 84.55
Log-likelihood -302.65 -301.88 -582.88 -291.46 -285.63 -556.66 -286.55 -279.28 -553.42
R2 0.78 0.78 0.78
Number of obsevations 290 305 570 290 305 570 290 305 580
Table 5. Cities by ranking 1 to 5 (other definitions of trade openness)
8.3) Share of trade with Jap+Ger+U.S. in GDP
City interaction parameter
8.5) Constructed share of trade in GDP
City interaction parameter
8.1) Share of trade in GDP
9.1) Share of trade in GDP x main city dummy
OLS Lag-ML Err-ML
Standard deviation reported below the estimated coefficients. ***significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
9.4) Import duties x main city dummy
9.5) Constructed share of trade in GDP x main city dummy
City interaction parameter
9.2) Weighted share of trade with the U.S. in GDP x main city dummy
9.3) Share of trade with Jap+Ger+U.S. in GDP x main city dummy
8.4) Import duties as percent of Imports
City interaction parameter








Dependent variable: Log of city population  1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data
-2.278** -1.153 -2.045*** -2.299** -1.178 -2.058*** -2.111* -0.808 -1.629**
(1.03) (0.91) (0.65) (0.99) (0.87) (0.63) (1.14) (0.96) (0.74)
0.514** 0.653*** 0.601*** 0.504** 0.630*** 0.589*** 0.585*** 0.615*** 0.666***
(0.23) (0.21) (0.14) (0.22) (0.21) (0.14) (0.19) (0.18) (0.12)
3) Capital city dummy 0.804*** 0.728*** 0.755*** 0.795*** 0.707*** 0.743*** 0.813*** 0.761*** 0.743***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
0.689*** 0.582*** 0.678*** 0.692*** 0.586*** 0.680*** 0.681*** 0.575*** 0.658***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
0.135*** 0.139*** 0.117*** 0.135*** 0.140*** 0.117*** 0.130*** 0.139*** 0.116***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
0.179 0.406*** 0.286*** 0.181** 0.406*** 0.287*** 0.204** 0.397*** 0.286***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
2.516*** 1.257*** 1.466*** 2.524*** 1.273*** 1.474*** 2.427*** 1.240*** 1.551***
(0.39) (0.39) (0.28) (0.37) (0.38) (0.27) (0.44) (0.44) (0.33)
0.254 -0.203 -0.097 0.245 -0.214 -0.105 0.071 -0.339 -0.310
(0.39) (0.30) (0.22) (0.37) (0.29) (0.22) (0.39) (0.30) (0.23)
0.113 -0.156 -0.064 0.125 -0.129 -0.050 -0.108 -0.187 -0.117
(0.37) (0.29) (0.21) (0.36) (0.28) (0.21) (0.31) (0.24) (0.17)
0.762*** 0.610*** 0.641*** 0.755*** 0.601*** 0.633*** 0.596** 0.556*** 0.460***
(0.24) (0.22) (0.15) (0.24) (0.21) (0.15) (0.24) (0.21) (0.15)
-0.931** -0.605** -0.723*** -0.923** -0.603** -0.718*** -0.569 -0.444 -0.402*
(0.40) (0.30) (0.22) (0.39) (0.28) (0.21) (0.40) (0.29) (0.22)
0.185 -0.079 -0.227 0.177 -0.092 -0.233 0.059 -0.143 -0.283*
(0.24) (0.23) (0.15) (0.23) (0.22) (0.15) (0.23) (0.22) (0.15)
-0.375 0.146 0.191 -0.362 0.162 0.200 -0.171 0.194 0.260
(0.39) (0.30) (0.22) (0.38) (0.29) (0.22) (0.38) (0.30) (0.22)
0.013 0.331** 0.126 0.017 0.343** 0.132 0.033 0.260 0.117
(0.14) (0.16) (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.10) (0.16) (0.18) (0.12)
-0.359** -0.480** -0.526*** -0.359** -0.474** -0.524*** -0.371* -0.511** -0.513***
(0.17) (0.21) (0.13) (0.16) (0.20) (0.12) (0.19) (0.23) (0.15)
-0.008 -0.030 0.062* -0.008 -0.030 0.062* -0.010 -0.023 0.051







RSrho 0.04 0.22 0.16
RS*rho 0.44 0.90 1.76
RSlambda 8.82 11.12 41.06
RS*lambda 9.22 11.80 42.67
RSlambdarho 9.26 12.02 42.83 9.26 12.02 42.83
Log-likelihood -152.38 -146.34 -284.76 -151.99 -145.86 -284.47 -147.12 -140.04 -263.35
R2 0.83 0.81 0.83
Number of obsevations 183 183 352 183 183 352 183 183 352
Standard deviation reported below the estimated coefficients. ***significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
Table 6. Share of urban population over 5 percent
Lag-MLOLS
14) Lack of political rights and civl liberties dummy
15) OECD country dummy
16) Log of telephone mainlines (per 1000 people)
8.1) Share of trade in GDP
9.1) Share of trade in GDP x main city dummy
19) City interaction parameter (lambda )
17) 1985-2000 dummy 
18) City interaction parameter (rho )
10) Port city dummy
11) Port city dummy x share of trade in GDP
12) Central location dummy
13) Central location dummy x share of trade in GDP
6) Log of real GDP per capita
7) Share of the labor force outside the agriculture
5) Log of land area
1) Intercept
2 Main city dummy










Dependent variable: Log of city population 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data
0.254 -0.203 -0.097 0.245 -0.214 -0.105 0.071 -0.339 -0.310
(0.39) (0.30) (0.22) (0.37) (0.29) (0.22) (0.39) (0.30) (0.23)
0.113 -0.156 -0.064 0.125 -0.129 -0.050 -0.108 -0.187 -0.117
(0.37) (0.29) (0.21) (0.36) (0.28) (0.21) (0.31) (0.24) (0.17)
-0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.223 0.235 0.256
(0.21) (0.47) (0.40) (3.46) (3.68) (0.08)
RSrho 0.04 0.22 0.16
RS*rho 0.44 0.90 1.76
RSlambda 8.82 11.12 41.06
RS*lambda 9.22 11.80 42.67
RSlambdarho 9.26 12.02 42.83 9.26 12.02 42.83
Log-likelihood -152.38 -146.34 -284.76 -151.99 -145.86 -284.47 -147.12 -140.04 -263.34
R2 0.83 0.81 0.83
Number of obsevations 183 183 352 183 183 352 183 183 352
210.230 51.061 401.660 211.880 60.375 410.970 186.230 -20.258 204.990
(423.92) (236.43) (376.51) (404.62) (225.37) (367.04) (417.47) (228.16) (366.51)
-250.000 23.061 -447.300 -238.670 45.926 -426.530 -365.800 -110.250 -475.310
(392.92) (226.62) (365.77) (375.42) (216.84) (357.32) (350.11) (190.81) (296.72)
-0.006 -0.010 -0.006 0.240 0.284 0.210
(0.56) (1.00) (0.84) (3.77) (4.62) (0.08)
RSrho 0.32 0.99 0.69
RS*rho 1.24 2.50 3.55
RSlambda 13.06 15.76 51.97
RS*lambda 13.98 17.27 54.83
RSlambdarho 14.30 18.26 55.52 14.30 18.26 55.52
Log-likelihood -155.11 -155.26 -295.00 -154.58 -154.39 -294.44 -148.17 -146.07 -268.49
R2 0.83 0.79 0.82
Number of obsevations 183 183 352 183 183 352 183 183 352
-0.816 0.175 0.165 -0.836* 0.176 0.160 -0.521 0.274 0.158
(0.53) (0.23) (0.21) (0.51) (0.22) (0.21) (0.50) (0.22) (0.22)
0.170 -0.071 0.073 0.195 -0.073 0.077 0.041 -0.155 -0.010
(0.58) (0.20) (0.21) (0.55) (0.19) (0.20) (0.51) (0.16) (0.19)
-0.008 -0.009 -0.006 0.234 0.296 0.202
(0.75) (0.87) (0.78) (3.66) (4.86) (0.08)
RSrho 0.56 0.75 0.60
RS*rho 1.57 2.18 3.39
RSlambda 10.82 17.44 52.68
RS*lambda 11.82 18.87 55.47
RSlambdarho 12.39 19.62 56.07 12.39 19.62 56.07
Log-likelihood -154.19 -154.44 -296.26 -153.54 -153.69 -295.74 -148.28 -144.53 -269.83
R2 0.83 0.79 0.82
Number of obsevations 183 183 352 183 183 352 183 183 352
2.441 3.173* 2.765** 3.232* 3.516** 3.313*** 1.125 1.872 1.237
(1.77) (1.63) (1.28) (1.71) (1.56) (1.27) (1.72) (1.67) (1.31)
-0.005 1.010 0.403 -0.302 0.790 0.127 1.378 1.626* 1.012
(1.41) (1.28) (0.91) (1.33) (1.22) (0.90) (1.19) (0.97) (0.75)
-0.008 -0.013 -0.014 0.271 0.385 0.205
(0.75) (1.15) (1.70) (4.15) (6.42) (0.08)
RSrho 3.36 1.29 2.84
RS*rho 5.77 3.76 6.58
RSlambda 12.44 27.28 32.81
RS*lambda 14.85 29.75 36.56
RSlambdarho 18.21 31.03 39.39 18.21 31.03 39.39
Log-likelihood -138.73 -133.38 -254.92 -136.58 -132.29 -253.24 -131.17 -117.42 -237.11
R2 0.84 0.80 0.83
Number of obsevations 164 158 310 164 158 310 164 158 310
-4.318* -2.915 -3.245** -4.387** -2.980* -3.283** -4.174* -2.621 -3.794**
(2.31) (1.82) (1.47) (2.22) (1.75) (1.44) (2.40) (1.87) (1.59)
0.851 0.517 -0.638 0.934 0.593 -0.598 -0.046 0.083 -0.943
(2.13) (1.50) (1.28) (2.05) (1.44) (1.25) (1.76) (1.23) (1.04)
-0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.233 0.235 0.302
(0.25) (0.33) (0.23) (3.51) (3.68) (0.09)
RSrho 0.06 0.11 0.05
RS*rho 0.57 0.69 1.24
RSlambda 11.55 11.81 32.66
RS*lambda 12.05 12.39 33.85
RSlambdarho 12.11 12.50 33.90 12.11 12.50 33.90
Log-likelihood -136.05 -146.67 -283.29 -135.61 -146.24 -283.03 -129.95 -140.07 -265.94
R2 0.84 0.81 0.81
Number of obsevations 168 183 330 168 183 330 168 183 330
Standard deviation reported below the estimated coefficients. ***significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
Table 7. Share of urban population over 5 percent (other definitions of trade openness)
OLS Lag-ML Err-ML
8.1) Share of trade in GDP
8.5) Constructed share of trade in GDP





9.1) Share of trade in GDP x main city dummy
8.2) Weigthed share of trade with the U.S. in GDP
9.2) Weighted share of trade with the U.S. in GDP x main city dummy
8.3) Share of trade with Jap+Ger+U.S. in GDP
9.3) Share of trade with Jap+Ger+U.S. in GDP x main city dummy
8.4) Import duties as percent of Imports






Dependent variable: Log of city population  1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data
4.556*** 4.371*** 4.279*** 5.782*** 5.696*** 5.398*** 4.461*** 4.578*** 4.358***
(1.49) (1.23) (0.90) (1.45) (1.20) (0.88) (1.46) (1.16) (0.87)
2.150*** 2.128*** 2.033*** 2.053*** 1.992*** 1.905*** 2.141*** 2.130*** 2.037***
(0.28) (0.27) (0.19) (0.26) (0.25) (0.18) (0.27) (0.26) (0.19)
0.296** 0.264** 0.368*** 0.430*** 0.397*** 0.519*** 0.304** 0.250* 0.365***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10)
0.407*** 0.343*** 0.424*** 0.320*** 0.267*** 0.348*** 0.410*** 0.337*** 0.422***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.039 0.002 -0.017 -0.038 -0.003 -0.022 -0.037 -0.003 -0.019
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
0.077 0.366*** 0.159** 0.075 0.321*** 0.147** 0.078 0.359*** 0.156**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06)
2.397*** 0.677 1.848*** 1.850*** 0.340 1.455*** 2.411*** 0.701 1.859***
(0.57) (0.54) (0.39) (0.57) (0.51) (0.38) (0.56) (0.51) (0.38)
2.229*** 1.379*** 1.543*** 1.922*** 1.157*** 1.269*** 2.214*** 1.397*** 1.553***
(0.63) (0.48) (0.38) (0.60) (0.45) (0.37) (0.61) (0.45) (0.37)
-2.850*** -2.320*** -2.394*** -2.249*** -1.719*** -1.759*** -2.823*** -2.331*** -2.411***
(0.57) (0.47) (0.36) (0.56) (0.46) (0.36) (0.55) (0.45) (0.35)
0.586*** 0.431** 0.4639*** 0.597*** 0.466** 0.488*** 0.578*** 0.448** 0.470***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19) (0.13)
-1.145** -0.557 -0.621* -1.112** -0.627 -0.633** -1.114** -0.604 -0.638**
(0.49) (0.42) (0.32) (0.46) (0.39) (0.30) (0.48) (0.40) (0.31)
0.320* 0.151 0.221* 0.405** 0.241 0.312** 0.315* 0.165 0.226*
(0.19) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.17) (0.12) (0.18) (0.17) (0.13)
-0.708 -0.266 -0.470 -1.047** -0.537 -0.801*** -0.689 -0.312 -0.488
(0.48) (0.39) (0.30) (0.46) (0.37) (0.30) (0.46) (0.38) (0.30)
0.039 0.362** 0.159* 0.001 0.326** 0.143* 0.038 0.360** 0.159*
(0.13) (0.16) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.08) (0.13) (0.15) (0.08)
-0.185 -0.337* -0.405*** -0.120 -0.247 -0.348** -0.188 -0.328* -0.404***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) (0.14)
-0.059 -0.067 -0.111** -0.049 -0.058 -0.119*** -0.059 -0.070 -0.113***







RSrho 10.83 15.13 26.58
RS*rho 10.85 15.83 27.51
RSlambda 0.06 0.16 0.05
RS*lambda 0.08 0.86 0.98
RSlambdarho 10.91 15.99 27.57 10.91 15.99 27.57
Log-likelihood -209.04 -188.46 -375.04 -203.26 -180.56 -361.50 -208.70 -188.04 -374.82
R2 0.48 0.43 0.49
Number of obsevations 224 224 417 224 224 417 224 224 417
Standard deviation reported below the estimated coefficients. ***significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
Table 8. Population over a million
1) Intercept
OLS Lag-ML
6) Log of real GDP per capita
7) Share of the labor force outside the agriculture
2 Main city dummy
3) Capital city dummy
Err-ML
15) OECD country dummy
16) Log of telephone mainlines (per 1000 people)
11) Port city dummy x share of trade in GDP
12) Central location dummy
13) Central location dummy x share of trade in GDP
8.1) Share of trade in GDP
10) Port city dummy
9.1) Share of trade in GDP x main city dummy
17) 1985-2000 dummy
18) City interaction parameter (rho )
19) City interaction parameter (lambda )
14) Lack of political rights and civl liberties dummy
4) Log of nonurbanized population










Dependent variable: Log of city population 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data 1970-1985 1985-2000 Panel Data
2.229*** 1.379*** 1.593*** 1.922*** 1.157*** 1.323*** 2.213*** 1.397*** 1.594***
(0.63) (0.48) (0.38) (0.60) (0.45) (0.37) (0.61) (0.45) (0.37)
-2.850*** -2.320*** -2.362*** -2.249*** -1.719*** -1.757*** -2.821*** -2.332*** -2.383***
(0.57) (0.47) (0.36) (0.56) (0.46) (0.36) (0.55) (0.45) (0.35)
0.049 0.054 0.051 0.030 -0.055 0.007
(3.37) (4.47) (5.18) (0.32) (0.57) (0.10)
RSrho 10.83 15.13 26.11
RS*rho 10.85 15.83 26.62
RSlambda 0.06 0.16 0.00
RS*lambda 0.08 0.86 0.51
RSlambdarho 10.91 15.99 26.62 10.91 15.99 26.62
Log-likelihood -209.04 -188.46 -379.25 -203.26 -180.56 -365.14 -208.70 -188.04 -378.20
R2 0.48 0.43 0.48
Number of obsevations 224 224 418 224 224 418 224 224 418
-404.640 -0.843 407.790 -380.950 -103.410 99.346 -461.560 -61.100 216.540
(662.10) (462.94) (721.42) (609.71) (421.38) (675.36) (659.08) (451.66) (727.11)
-496.270 -121.320 -684.590 -467.850 -51.904 -573.680 -452.530 -92.712 -582.060
(701.03) (480.88) (754.18) (645.52) (437.49) (702.12) (660.17) (460.86) (730.48)
0.064 0.062 0.063 0.150 0.072 0.118
(4.59) (5.22) (6.66) (1.68) (0.78) (1.79)
RSrho 20.02 25.10 42.29
RS*rho 18.58 24.83 40.41
RSlambda 1.92 0.29 2.15
RS*lambda 0.48 0.02 0.27
RSlambdarho 20.50 25.12 42.56 20.50 25.12 42.56
Log-likelihood -225.48 -205.46 -407.62 -215.11 -192.33 -385.88 -224.04 -204.95 -405.80
R2 0.40 0.33 0.41
Number of obsevations 224 224 418 224 224 418 224 224 418
1.844* 0.963 1.710*** 1.269 0.591 1.299** 1.683 0.970 1.682***
(1.08) (0.71) (0.61) (1.00) (0.66) (0.57) (1.07) (0.68) (0.61)
-3.240*** -1.429* -1.935*** -2.533** -0.816 -1.292** -3.051*** -1.436** -1.880***
(1.12) (0.74) (0.66) (1.05) (0.70) (0.62) (1.09) (0.72) (0.65)
0.061 0.058 0.059 0.115 -0.009 0.073
(4.39) (4.75) (6.23) (1.27) (0.09) (1.08)
RSrho 18.15 21.01 37.15
RS*rho 17.30 21.46 36.37
RSlambda 0.95 0.00 0.78
RS*lambda 0.10 0.45
RSlambdarho 18.25 21.46 37.15 18.25 21.46 37.15
Log-likelihood -220.15 -201.83 -400.90 -210.67 -190.82 -381.66 -219.24 -201.53 -399.82
R2 0.43 0.35 0.43 0
Number of obsevations 224 224 418 224 224 418 224 224 418
0.130 0.171 0.469 -0.173 0.033 0.329 0.181 0.177 0.569
(1.37) (1.16) (0.89) (1.27) (1.05) (0.83) (1.41) (1.13) (0.91)
0.809 1.305 1.020 1.701 2.295** 1.739* 0.866 1.328 1.103
(1.27) (1.14) (0.89) (1.19) (1.05) (0.90) (1.21) (1.09) (0.92)
0.067 0.066 0.065 0.163 0.046 0.124
(4.27) (5.05) (6.25) (1.72) (0.46) (1.75)
RSrho 17.37 23.54 37.31
RS*rho 16.04 23.60 35.45
RSlambda 1.75 0.09 2.20
RS*lambda 0.43 0.14 0.34
RSlambdarho 17.79 23.69 37.65 17.79 23.69 37.65
Log-likelihood -211.87 -190.80 -379.56 -202.84 -178.47 -360.73 -210.45 -190.40 -378.07
R2 0.38 0.33 0.40
Number of obsevations 206 205 382 206 205 382 206 205 382
20.198*** 9.929*** 10.337*** 18.144*** 9.326*** 8.269*** 20.040*** 9.938*** 10.191***
(4.81) (2.97) (2.69) (4.59) (2.75) (2.57) (4.65) (2.84) (2.66)
-22.267*** -10.383*** -12.259*** -18.112*** -7.692*** -7.847*** -22.087***-10.434*** -12.029***
(4.23) (2.55) (2.29) (4.22) (2.43) (2.29) (4.06) (2.47) (2.23)
0.044 0.054 0.058 0.030 -0.048 0.050
(3.00) (4.47) (5.72) (0.32) (0.50) (0.73)
RSrho 8.57 18.75 31.47
RS*rho 8.57 19.50 31.27
RSlambda 0.06 0.11 0.30
RS*lambda 0.05 0.86 0.10
RSlambdarho 8.63 19.62 31.57 8.63 19.62 31.57
Log-likelihood -205.28 -192.16 -385.86 -200.64 -182.34 -369.58 -204.94 -191.77 -385.20
R2 0.48 0.41 0.46
Number of obsevations 222 224 416 222 224 416 222 224 416
Standard deviation reported below the estimated coefficients. ***significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
Table 9. Population over a million (other definitions of trade openness)
8.1) Share of trade in GDP
City interaction parameter
City interaction parameter
9.2) Weighted share of trade with the U.S. in GDP x main city dummy
OLS Lag-ML Err-ML
9.1) Share of trade in GDP x main city dummy
8.2) Weigthed share of trade with the U.S. in GDP
8.3) Share of trade with Jap+Ger+U.S. in GDP
City interaction parameter
City interaction parameter
9.3) Share of trade with Jap+Ger+U.S. in GDP x main city dummy
City interaction parameter
8.4) Import duties as percent of Imports
9.4) Import duties x main city dummy
8.5) Constructed share of trade in GDP




Dependent variable: Log of city population  1 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5 1 to 2 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 5
2.627** -2.283** -1.978** -2.541*** -2.858*** -2.316** -1.658* -1.822** -1.854** -2.175* -1.472 -2.208* -2.145
(1.08) (1.13) (1.01) (0.92) (0.90) (1.02) (0.92) (0.84) (0.81) (1.23) (1.22) (1.21) (1.32)
1.124*** 1.293*** 1.562*** 1.673*** 1.303*** 1.458*** 1.749*** 1.842*** 1.061*** 1.367*** 1.604*** 1.686***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19)
0.278** 0.491*** 0.508*** 0.469*** 0.540*** 0.586*** 0.578*** 0.558*** 0.633*** 0.605*** 0.558*** 0.543*** 0.635***
(0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
0.184* 0.584*** 0.583*** 0.594*** 0.590*** 0.494*** 0.447*** 0.415*** 0.375*** 0.576*** 0.563*** 0.583*** 0.568***
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
0.004 0.151*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.145*** 0.134*** 0.109*** 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.157*** 0.135** 0.141*** 0.157***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
0.266** 0.430*** 0.466*** 0.465*** 0.478*** 0.365*** 0.361*** 0.315*** 0.266*** 0.420*** 0.432*** 0.431*** 0.399***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
-0.123 0.956** 0.845** 0.720* 0.598* 0.802** 0.679* 0.606* 0.592* 1.000** 0.947* 0.861* 0.864
(0.43) (0.45) (0.40) (0.38) (0.35) (0.41) (0.37) (0.34) (0.31) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.53)
-0.398 0.848* 0.093 0.398 0.292 0.845* 0.052 0.333 0.214 0.788 -0.136 0.228 0.072
(0.50) (0.50) (0.34) (0.33) (0.31) (0.45) (0.31) (0.30) (0.28) (0.49) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34)
-0.320 -0.316 -0.414 -0.477 -0.395 -0.405 -0.560* -0.596* -0.354 -0.486* -0.577** -0.632**
(0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (0.38) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34) (0.33) (0.26) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28)
0.399 0.903*** 0.300 0.379 0.332 0.844*** 0.229 0.303 0.271 0.855*** 0.196 0.296 0.323
(0.29) (0.28) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.26) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.27) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20)
-0.279 -1.278*** -0.616* -0.824** -0.690** -1.143*** -0.424 -0.581* -0.421 -1.096*** -0.282 -0.463 -0.299
(0.43) (0.41) (0.34) (0.36) (0.34) (0.38) (0.31) (0.33) (0.31) (0.41) (0.33) (0.34) (0.31)
0.142 0.267 -0.079 0.130 0.060 0.262 -0.092 0.083 0.037 0.321 -0.123 0.094 -0.019
(0.27) (0.28) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.26) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.27) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21)
-0.097 -0.338 0.020 -0.226 0.007 -0.339 0.053 -0.167 0.013 -0.446 0.153 -0.147 0.129
(0.37) (0.40) (0.34) (0.36) (0.34) (0.36) (0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.39) (0.31) (0.34) (0.32)
0.250 0.356 0.425** 0.502*** 0.500*** 0.300 0.327* 0.330* 0.283* 0.358 0.403 0.457* 0.411
(0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
-0.385* -0.359 -0.372 -0.285 -0.303 -0.282 -0.264 -0.201 -0.166 -0.317 -0.322 -0.246 -0.242
(0.23) (0.27) (0.25) (0.23) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.19) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31)
0.054 0.010 0.012 0.036 0.039 0.003 -0.002 0.015 0.015 0.002 0.003 0.029 0.025
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
-0.040
(0.06)
0.026 0.050 0.034 0.052 0.023 0.054 0.036 0.052 0.031 0.065 0.032 0.069
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
0.156 0.218 0.281 0.349
(2.84) (3.94) (5.31) (7.03)
0.203 0.282 0.334 0.429
(3.64) (5.03) (6.17) (8.81)
RSrho 6.25 12.78 24.02 42.89
RS*rho 2.65 1.86 0.14 1.01
RSlambda 8.70 18.40 29.89 58.10
RS*lambda 5.10 7.49 6.02 16.22
RSlambdarho 11.35 20.26 30.03 59.11 11.35 20.26 30.03 59.11
Log-likelihood -32.67 -128.93 -187.48 -247.46 -304.72 -124.89 -180.62 -235.71 -285.45 -123.09 -176.92 -232.20 -277.49
R2 Adjusted 0.86 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.77
Number of obsevations 81 148 201 252 300 148 201 252 300 148 201 252 300
Table 10. Cities by ranking  1985-2000 (Testing Krugman´s 1991 hypothesis)  
17) Log of urbanized population
18) Road Index
20) City interaction parameter (lambda )
13) Central location dummy x share of trade in GDP
14) Lack of political rights and civl liberties dummy
16) Log of telephone mainlines (per 1000 people)
OLS Lag-ML
Standard deviation reported below the estimated coefficients. ***significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
1) Intercept
2 Main city dummy
3) Capital city dummy
4) Log of nonurbanized population
5) Log of land area
Err-ML
21) City interaction parameter (rho )
6) Log of real GDP per capita
7) Share of the labor force outside the agriculture
8.1) Share of trade in GDP
15) OECD country dummy
11) Port city dummy x share of trade in GDP
12) Central location dummy
9.1) Share of trade in GDP x main city dummy

















Calculations carried out in MATLAB 
 
 


















Calculations carried out in MATLAB 
 











Source: World Bank Indicators 
 
 











Appendix 1: World cities sample 




1. Canada: Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Ottawa and Calgary. 
2. United States: NY, LA, Chicago, Philadelphia, Miami, Dallas-Fort 
Worth, Boston, Washington, D.C., Detroit, Houston, Atlanta, San 
Francisco-Oakland, Phoenix-Mesa, Seattle, San Diego, Minneapolis, 
Baltimore, St. Louis, Tampa-St. Petersburg, Denver-Aurora, Cleveland, 
Pittsburgh, Portland, San Jose, Riverside-San Bernardino, Cincinnati, 
Sacramento, Virginia Beach, Kansas City, Las Vegas, San Antonio, 
Milwaukee, Indianapolis, Providence, Orlando, Columbus and New 
Orleans. 
3. Mexico: Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Toluca, Puebla, 





4. Costa Rica: San Jose. 
5. Dominican Republic: Santo Domingo, Santiago, Romana, San Pedro 
de Macoris and San Francisco de Macoris 
6. El Salvador: San Salvador, Apopa, San Miguel, Santa Ana and Nueva 
San Salvador. 
7. Guatemala: Guatemala City and Quetzaltenango. 
8. Haiti: Port-au-Prince and Cape Haitien. 
9. Honduras: Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, La Ceiba and Choloma.  
10. Jamaica: Kingston. 
11. Nicaragua: Managua, Leon, Chinandega, Masaya and Tipitapa. 
12. Panama: Panama City, Colon and David. 
 
 







Table 11. continued 
 




13. Argentina: Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Rosario, Mendoza, San Miguel 
de Tucumán. 
14. Bolivia: La Paz, Santacruz, Cochabamba, Oruro and Sucre. 
15. Brazil: Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, 
Recife, Salvador, Fortaleza, Brasilia, Curitiba, Campiñas, Belem, 
Goiania, Santos, Grande Vitoria, Manaus. 
16. Chile: Santiago, Concepcion, Viña del Mar, Antofagasta and 
Valparaíso. 
17. Colombia: Santa Fe de Bogota, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla and 
Bucaramanga. 
18. Ecuador: Guayaquil, Quito, Cuenca, Santo Domingo and Machala. 
19. Paraguay: Asunción and Ciudad del Este. 
20. Peru: Lima, Arequipa, Trujillo, Chiclayo and Iquitos. 
21. Uruguay: Montevideo and Salto. 













Table 11. continued 
 





23. India: Bombay, Calcuta, Delhi, Madras, Bangalore, Hyderabad, 
Ahmadabad,Pune, Surta, Kanpur, Jaipur, Lucknow, Nagpur, Patna, 
Indore, Vadodara, Bhopal, Coimbatore, Ludhiana, Kochi, Viskhapatnam, 
Agra, Varanasi,Madurai, Meerut, Nashik, Jabalpur, Jamshedpur, 
Asansol, Dhanbad, Allahabad and Faridabad,. 
24. Indonesia: Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaja, Medan and Palembang. 
25. Israel: Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, Be´er Sheva ad Ashgelon. 
26. Japan: Tokyo, Osaka-Kobe, Nagoya, Fukuoka-Kitakyushu, Kyoto 
and Sapporo. 
27. Jordan: Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, Russeifa and Wad-as-Sir. 
28. Korea: Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Inch´on, Taejon, Kwangju and Ulsan.  
29. Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur, Klang, JohoreBharu, Ipoh and Petaling 
Jaya. 
30. Nepal: Katmandu, Biratnagar, Lalitpur, Pokhara and Birgunj. 
31. Pakistan: Karachi,Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Multan, 
Gujranwala, Hyderabad and Peshawar. 
32. Philipines: Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu, Zamboanga and Cagayan de 
Oro. 
33. Saudi Arabia: Riyadh, Jidda, Mecca, Medina and Damman. 
34. Sri Lanka: Colombo, Dehiwala/Mt. Lavinia, Moratuwa, Jaffna and 
Negombo. 
35. Syria: Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Lattakia and Hama. 
36. Thailand: Bangkok, Nontaburi, Nakhon-Ratchasima, Chon Buri and 
Chiang Mai. 









Table 11. continued 
 
Region Country: Cities 
  
Europe 38. Austria: Vienna, Linz, Graz, Salzburg ad Innsbruck. 
39. Belgium: Brussels, Antwerpen, Liège, Cherleroi and Gent. 
40. Denmark: Copenhagen, Arhus, Odense and Aalborg. 
41. Finland: Helsinki, Tampere, Turku, Oulu and Lahti. 
42. France: Paris, Lyon, Marseille-Aix-en- Provence, Lille and Nice-
Cannes. 
43. Germany: Rhein-Ruhr North, Rhein- Main, Berlin, Rhein-Ruhr 
Middle, Rhein-Ruhr South, Sttutgart, Hamburg, Munich, Rhein-Neckar, 
Bielefeld, Hannover, Nuremberg and Aachen. 
44. Greece: Athens, Thessaloniki, Pátrai, Irákilon and Vólos. 
45. Ireland: Dublin and Cork. 
46. Italy: Milan, Naples, Rome, Turin and Genoa. 
47. The Netherlands: Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague, Ultrech and 
Eindhoven-Tivoli. 
48. Norway: Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, Trondheim and Frederikstad. 
49. Portugal: Lisbon, Porto, Penisula of Setubal, Braga and Funchal. 
50. Spain: Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Sevilla and Málaga. 
51. Swiss: Zürich, Geneve, Basel, Bern and Lausanne. 
52. Turkey: Istambul, Ankara,Izmir, Bursa and Adana. 











Table 11. continued 
 
Region Country: Cities 
  
Africa 54. Argelia: Algiers, Oran, Constantine, Annaba and Batna. 
55. Benin: Cotonou, Djougu, Porto- Novo and Parakou. 
56. Burkina Faso: Ouagadougu, Koudogou and Bobo- Dioulasso. 
57. Burundi: Bujumburi. 
58. Camerun: Douala, Yaoundé, Garova, Marova and Bamenda. 
59. Central Afircan Republic: Bangui, Berberati, Bouar, Carnot and 
Bambari. 
60. Chad: N´Djamena. 
61. Egypt: Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, and Al-Mahalla al-Kubra. 
62. Ethiopia: Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Nazret, Gondar and Dessie.  
63. Ghana: Accra, Kumasi, Secondi Takoradi, Tamale ad Ashaiman. 
64. Ivory Coast: Abidjan, Bouake, Yamoussoukro, Daloa and Korhogo. 
65. Kenya: Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumo, Nakuro and Eldoret. 
66. Liberia: Monrovia. 
67.Madagascar: Antananarivo, Toamasino, Antsirabe, Fianarantsoa ad 
Mahajanga. 
68. Malawi: Blantyre- Lymbe, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. 
69. Mali: Bamako and Sikasso. 
70. Morocco: Casablanca, Rabat, Fès, Marrakech ad Agadir. 
71. Niger: Niamey, Maradi and Zinder. 
72. Nigeria: Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Kaduna and Benin City. 
73. Rwanda: Kigala. 
74. Senegal: Dakar, Thies, Kaolak, Ziguinchor and Saint Louis. 
75. Sierra Leone: Freetown. 
76. Somalia: Mogadishu and Merca. 
77. Sudan: Khartoum, Port Sudan, Nyala, Kassala and Al Obeid. 
78. Tanzania: Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mbeya, Mwanza and  Zanzíbar. 
79. Togo: Lomé. 
80. Tunisia: Tunis, Sfax,Sousse, Dejerba ad Kairouan. 
81. Uganda: Kampala, Gulu, Jinja and Lira. 
82. Dem. Rep. Congo: Kinshasa, Lubumbashi Mbuji-Mayi, Boma and 
Kisangani. 
83. Zambia: Lusaka, Kitwe, Ndola, Kabwe ad Chingola. 





Appendix 2: Construction of the instrumental variable 
We construct the instrumental variable as follows. First, we estimate the 
coefficients of the gravity equation (6) from (Frankel and Romer, 1999). 












where ij/GDPi is the share of trade between country i and j in GDP at country i; Dij is the 
distance between country i and country j; Ni and Nj denote the population in country i and 
country j, respectively; Li and Lj denote a dummy if country i and j have access to sea, 
respectively. See (Anderson & Wincoop, 2003) for a critique of the gravity equation. The 
information is obtained for 1970 and 1985 and 165 countries. The potential number of 
observations is 165
2
, however there are missing observations in both periods. Information 
was obtained from John Helliwell´s data set. The instrumental variable is then calculated 
using 








Table 12 is a regression of the actual share of trade in GDP on the instrumental 
variable. The sample only includes the 84 countries. They are correlated and R
2
 are 










2) Constructed share of trade in GDP 
0.355 0.33.8 
8.397 7.656 
Coefficient of correlation 0.630 0.494 
R
2
 0.397 0.244 
Number of observations 84 76 
* Calculations carried out in MATLAB; t-values reported below estimated coefficients 
 
















Appendix 3: Data sources 
Variable Units Period Source 
    
Capital city dummy. 1 or 0. n.a. 1999 Encarta 
Encyclopedia 
Central location dummy. 1 or 0  CIA World 
Factbook. 
Distance from city i to city j. Kms. n. a. Own calculations 
using longitude 






GDP per capita in 2000 prices. U.S. $ Average 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 





Import duties as a fraction of 
Imports. 

















Table 14. continued 
 
Variable Units Period Source 
    
Lack of Civil Liberties and Political 
Rights (goes from 1 to 7 each one) 
Dummy. 










1971 .., 2000. 
Freedom in the 
World of 
Freedom House. 




1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 





Log of nonurbanized population. Thousands. Average 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 
1990, …, 2000. 
Average 70, 
..,2000. 




Log of urbanized population outside 
the i most populated cities. 
Thousands. Average 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 
1990, …, 2000. 
Average 70, 
..,2000. 
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Variable Units Period Source 
    
OECD dummy. 0 or 1. n.a. OECD web site. 
Population in the 5 largest cities.  Thousands. Average 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 
1990, …, 2000. 
 




Port city dummy. 1 or 0. n.a 1999 Encarta 
Enciclopedia. 
Roads, total network  
 
Kms Average 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 





Share of Imports in GDP. (0,1) Average 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 





Share of the non agricultural labor 
force. 
(0, 1) Average 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 
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Variable Units Period Source 
    
Share of trade, imports and exports 
in GDP. 
(0, 1) Average 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 





Share of trade, imports and exports 
with Jap+U.S.+Ger in GDP. 
(0, 1) Average 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 
















Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 
people). 
 
[0, ) Average 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 





World bilateral trade. U.S.$ 1970 and 1985 John F. 
Helliwell´s data 
set. 
Weighted share of trade, imports and 
exports with US in GDP. 
(0, 1) Average 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 
1985. 
Average 1985, 






CIA The World 
Factbook. 
 
